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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Alan A. Creel appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of
marijuana in excess of three ounces. Mr. Creel pleaded guilty but preserved the right to
appeal the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. Because there was no
reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop which resulted in his arrest,
Mr. Creel asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 15, 2009, an Ada County Deputy was following a black Chevrolet S-10
truck in Boise.

(R., p.32.) 1

He ran the license plate on his Mobile Data Terminal.

(R., p.32.) According to the license plate registration, the vehicle should have been red
in color.

(R., p.32.)

(R., p.32.)
(R., p.32.)

Based upon this information, the deputy initiated a traffic stop.

Upon approaching the vehicle, the deputy noticed the odor of marijuana.
During the subsequent investigation, approximately seven ounces of

marijuana was found in the vehicle-.
Mr. Creel was charged with one count of possession of marijuana in excess of
three ounces. (R., p.23.) He filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the traffic stop
was illegal.

(R., p.30.)

Mr. Creel asserted that the tact that his vehicle had been

painted black did not provide the deputy with reasonable, articulable suspicion to
conduct a traffic stop. (R., pp.33-34.) The parties agreed to forego a hearing and have
the motion decided on the stipulated facts. (R., p.69.)

1

Mr. Creel and the State stipulated to these facts. (R., p.36; 52.)

1

Based on the limited nature of the stipulated facts, the district court held that
State had failed to meet its burden of proof that the stop was justified.

(R., p.70.)

However, the court also ruled that Mr. Creel had failed to meet his burden of proof of the
nexus between the stop of his truck and the discovery of the marijuana. (R., p.71.) The
court therefore denied the motion. (R., p.71.) However, Mr. Creel then requested an
evidentiary hearing, which the court granted. (R., p.78.)
The district court found the following facts: About two week prior to the traffic
stop at issue, Mr. Creel had the painted his pickup black by rolling on black bed lining.
(R., p.80.) There was still a red border around parts of the pickup where Mr. Creel had
failed to properly tape it. (R., p.80.) Mr. Creel had not notified the Department of Motor
Vehicles about the change in color and the registration stickers on the license plates
were good through March 2010. (R., p.80.)
The deputy had been following Mr. Creel's pickup and ran the license plate on
the Mobile Data Terminal, which indicated that the pickup should have been red in
color. (R., p.80.) The deputy could not tell that the pickup had been painted with bed
liniAg, and stated that it did not look like the painting had been professionally done.
(R., p.80.)

The deputy thought that, due to the color discrepancy, the vehicle could

have had fictitious license plates or the vehicle could have been stolen and plates from
another Chevrolet S-10 picks could have been put on. (R., p.80.) The deputy stopped
the vehicle to investigate. (R., p.80.)
After stopping the pickup, the deputy discussed the color discrepancy with
Mr. Creel and Mr. Creel acknowledged painting the pickup and stated that he had not
notified the Department of Motor Vehicles. (R., p.80.) While speaking with Mr. Creel,
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the deputy smelled the odor of marijuana.

(R., p,80.)

The deputy believed that

Mr. Creel had been using marijuana, and upon a subsequent search of the vehicle,
marijuana was discovered. (R., p.81.)
The district court held that Mr. Creel met his burden to proof with regard to the
nexus between the stop and the discovery of marijuana, but denied the motion to
suppress on the basis that the State had established an objectively reasonable and
articulable suspicion to conduct the stop. (R., p.81.)
Mr. Creel subsequently pleaded guilty but preserved the right to appeal from the
denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.100.) The district court accepted the agreement
and imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, and suspended the
sentence and placed Mr. Creel on probation.

(R., p, 104.)

Mr. Creel appealed.

(R., p .113.) He asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Creel's motion to suppress?

4

ARGUIVIENT

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Creel's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Creel asserts that, because the deputy lacked reasonable, articulable

suspicion that he had committed a crime or that criminal activity was afoot, the stop of
his vehicle was illegal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which
were supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561,
916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Creel's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment permits limited detentions of individuals, such as those

which occur during a traffic stop, if the officer who seizes the individual possesses
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a
crime. See, e.g., State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 298 (Ct. App. 2001 ). In the context of
a traffic stop, this standard amounts to whether, based upon the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the stop, the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the traffic laws were being violated. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 552,
554 (Ct. App. 2000).
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The Deputy lacked this reasonable, articulable suspicion. The sole reason for
the stop was that the color of the vehicle was different than the color listed on the
registration. Mr. Creel was not violated the law in any way while he was driving the van.
He was obeying all traffic laws. Nothing about the way the vehicle was being driven
confirmed any hunch that the license plates might be fictitious or that the vehicle might
have been stolen. Mr. Creel submits that simply a having a different color on a vehicle
other than the color listed on the registration, without any more indication of how a crime
may have been committed or how criminal activity may be afoot, is not enough
information to give a law enforcement officer reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop
that vehicle.
Mr. Creel had committed no crime. He had simply painted his vehicle a different
color. The make and model of the vehicle were the same - Mr. Creel was driving a
Chrevrolet S-10 and the registration was for a Chevrolet S-10.

Further, the deputy

testified that paint job did not look professional, indicating that someone had simply
painted the vehicle a different color rather than changing the plates. Had the model of
the vehicle been different, the Deputy could have possessed reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the license plates had been switched; here, it is quite unlikely that a
person would switch license plates from the same model to another. The plates had not
been reported stolen, and there was nothing about Mr. Creel's driving that indicated that
he was violating the law. Under these facts, Mr. Creel submits that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress because the Deputy lacked reasonable,
articulable suspicion, other than a mere hunch, that any crime may have been
committed or that criminal activity may be afoot.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Creel respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 24 th day of February, 2012.

JUS-UIN'~. CURTIS
Deputy S~te Appellate Public Defender
',-,,J

7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of February, 2012, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
ALAN A CREEL
5321 FAIRMONT ST
BOISE ID 83706
TIMOTHY HANSEN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
EMAILED BRIEF
JONATHAN LOSCHI
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
EMAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Hand Delivered to lnbox at Supreme Court

JMC/ns

8

